Chapter 14 (2001)

Ubuntu and the globalisation of Southern African thought and society

To the memory of Vernie February

14.1. Ubuntu in various Southern African contexts and in a researcher’s personal itinerary

Over the past twenty years, 1 ubuntu (a word from the Nguni language cluster which comprises Zulu, Xhosa, Swati, and Ndebele) and the equivalent Shona word hunhu have been explored as viable philosophical concepts in the context of majority rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the hands of academic philosophers, ubuntu/hunhu has become a key concept to evoke the unadulterated forms of African social life before the European conquest. The world view (in other words the values, beliefs, and images) of pre-colonial Southern Africa is claimed to survive today, more or less, in remote villages and intimate kin relationships, and to constitute an inspiring blueprint for the present and future of social, economic and political life in urban and modern environments, at the very centres of the economy and the political system. It is thus that ubuntu/hunhu also serves as a concept in management ideologies in the transitional stages of post-apartheid. How does one manage the contradictions of the post-apartheid situation? That situation comprises: Africa’s most viable economy; a highly complex, largely urban and industrial society; an over-developed state apparatus originally geared to oppression of the majority of its population; caste-like intra-societal divisions in terms of wealth, education, information, and concrete social power; the newly-gained constitutional equality of all South African citizens; the rising expectations among Black people who have historically been denied the White minority’s privileges of class and colour; the majority’s simmering resentment, both about past wrongs and about the slowness of present compensations and rewards; a drive among individual Blacks to gain

financial and occupational security as quickly as possible; the highest rates of violent crime in the world today; and above all the general traumatisation that comes with having lived under, and having survived, the apartheid state: being forced to realise that no amount of economic gain and political power can erase the permanent damage to the personality through earlier humiliation, oppression, exclusion, and loss – and the desperate question as to what source of wisdom, identity, meaning, salvation could heal such trauma. The contradictions which this combination of traits present have been manifest in myriad forms over the past decade. To confront these contradictions by an effective, factual renewal of social, economic, judicial and political life is a formidable task, one that needs new and historically insuspect concepts, new sources of meaning and transformation, among which that of ubuntu has been prominently proposed.

The form of the word ubuntu (and all equivalent forms in neighbouring languages) is purely productive in the morphological linguistic sense. It is the result of coupling the prefix generating abstract words and concepts (i.e. ubu-, in the Nguni languages) to the general root -ntu which one and a half centuries ago persuaded the pioneering German linguist Bleek1 to recognise as a large Bantu-speaking family: the entire group of languages, spoken from the Cape of Good Hope to the Sudanic belt, where the root -ntu stands for ‘human’.2 Today we consider Bantu as a subfamily of the Niger-Congo linguistic family, which encompasses most of sub-Saharan Africa. Several morphological combinations involving the root -ntu are possible in any Bantu language; for example, in the Nkoya language of western central Zambira, the following forms appear: shintu ‘human’, muntu ‘a human’, bantu ‘humans, people’, wuntu ‘human-ness, the quality of being human, kantu ‘Mr Human’, Buntu ‘the country of humankind’, etc.

Now, it is only human for such a basic word to have a very wide and internally richly textured semantic field, a vast area of possibilities and implications, out of which in concrete contexts a specific selection is being made, triggered by the juxtapositions which accompany the root -ntu (in its specific morphological elaborations) in that context.

Such a semantic field may be mapped out by born speakers of Bantu languages on the basis of their introspection, but it is also open to empirical study by anyone

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1 Bleek 1851.
2 There are indications that the root -ntu, and its semantic field, are not really unique to Bantu languages. In Proto-Austronesian, i.e. Malayo-Polynesian languages an essentially similar root, taw, appears with the same meaning ‘human’; cf. Adelaar 1994. The distribution of these languages is not limited to South East Asia and the Pacific: also the languages of Madagascar belong to this group, and some South and South East Asian influence on the formation of Bantu is quite likely; cf. van Binsbergen, forthcoming (c). (a): A cognate form probably exists even in proto-Sino-Tibetan *d@:lH, ‘bottom’, which in Old Chinese became ti, see Karlgren 1957: no. 0590 c. It is quite possible that we have another cognate, in the Indo-European domain, in the root *endh, ‘low’ ‘turned towards the earth’, which has been argued to underlie Ancient Greek anthr̩opoς and Athenai; and which incidentally we may also suspect under the West Germanic words under/unter/onder. Cf. Ode 1927.
who assesses the characteristics of the various situations in which expressions featuring the root -ntu can be overheard.

Thus, in the context of ritual in a Southern African village setting without strangers present, -ntu will primarily be used in opposition to the non-human visible world of the animal, vegetal and mineral kingdom, and to the invisible world of the supernatural, spirits, ancestors, gods, God. In this cosmological domain, not too much emphasis would be placed (as would be the case in Islam and Christianity) on the differences between -ntu and other ontological categories, but instead the essential continuity between these categories would be acknowledged. When a hunter, after killing a large animal (lion, elephant), cannot simply return to the village but has to be cleansed first at the village boundary as if he were a murderer, this rule defines both the village as the purified, domesticated domain of the human by contrast to uncontrolled nature, and also the anthropomorphic qualities attributed to the animal in the sense of being capable of taking revenge and requiring propitiation.1 The notion of supernatural transcendence is only weakly articulated in this Southern African world view. Hence the difficulty of attributing the inevitable element of decay, death and destruction in human life to a transcendent divine agency; instead, in a sorcery-based conception of evil, humans tend to be blamed for the negative side of life.

Somewhat contrasting with the cosmological application of -ntu, in a socio-legal context, when articulating the nature and degree of a person’s transgression of social and religious norms, -ntu is likely to be used in order to juxtapose the inhuman, not in the sense of ‘being bestial or divine’, but in the sense of being ‘of humans, but transgressing the scope of humanity’. The latter applies to sorcery; to extreme and uncalled-for violence especially between kinsmen; and to the extreme transgression of codes of conduct which regulate the behaviour between genders and between age groups (showing disrespect vis-à-vis elders, overburdening under-age children, committing incest and murder, etc.). There is a clear link here with the world view discussed in the preceding paragraph: under such human transgressions, nature is supposed to grind to a halt, life force is reduced to a minimum, and as a result crops fail, births stagnate, and death prevails, until the cosmological order is restored by socio-legal-ritual means – by a king if the society as a whole is affected, by a lesser chief or a diviner-priest in cases of more restricted scope. Two ways are open to handle the contradiction between ‘human’ and ‘no-longer-human’ under this aspect of -ntu: the transgressing person may be coaxed back into the folds of humanity (by means of collective reconciliation, prayers at the ancestral shrine, elaborate admonitions, ritual cleansing, judicial action, payment of a fine), or declared to be hopeless and treated accordingly. In the latter case, the return to humanity is ruled out by killing the perpetrator – either by administering the poison ordeal under the supervision of a king, chief or diviner-priest, or, in the absence or behind the back of these authorities, by lynching. This shows that -ntu as a legal category is not

1 This is the situation among the Nkoya and throughout South Central Africa; cf. Marks 1976.
ininitely accommodating, not without boundaries: extreme anti-social behaviour is its boundary condition.

Finally, when strangers are part of the social situation in which the concept -ntu is being used, especially in the colonial and post-colonial situation in Africa, -ntu invokes local, autochthonous humanity, by contrast to beings who somatically and historically clearly stand out as not autochthonous, and whose very humanity therefore may be called into question, or even denied. The colonial officer, the missionary, the anthropologist, the capitalist farmer, the industrial manager and entrepreneur, for a century or more right up to the to the establishment of Black majority rule in Southern Africa, could never (and would never) aspire to the status of muntu in the eyes of the African majority population. In the colonial situation, therefore, the word muntu, or in its plural form bantu, emerged, in English and Afrikaans as spoken by the White dominant group, to contemptuously denote African colonial subjects – by opposition to their political, industrial and spiritual, self-styled ‘masters’, the Whites.1 White muntu, ‘muntu-lover’, etc. was a common insult used by Whites against those who, despite European somatic features and origin, transgressed the boundaries of colonial society and identified with Blacks against the perceived, short-term interest of the White colonial presence. For a White person entertaining such Wahlverwandtschaften2 with Blacks in the colonial and post-colonial situation, part of her or his struggle for an Africa-oriented self-definition was to be accepted, by African friends, as muntu.

Indeed, I shall never forget how deeply moved I was when, after more than ten years of intensive contact with the Nkoya people in the context of anthropological and historical fieldwork in Zambia, one of my close Nkoya friends explained my position to another Nkoya man who, not knowing me personally, was uneasy about my presence in an otherwise fully Nkoya environment. My friend said:

Byo, baji muntu, baji kankoya – ‘no, can’t you see, he is a [Black] person, he is a Nkoya’.

Against this background it was a shock for me to be denied muntu-status in the urban, capitalist environment of Francistown, Botswana, and the surrounding Northeast District, a part of Botswana that ever since the late nineteenth century had been thoroughly exposed to the devastating effects of White monopoly capitalism. There, any person having (like me) Dutch as his ethnic identity and mother tongue, was irrevocably3 a hereditary enemy, a liburu (‘Boer-

1 Cf. Branford c.s. 1991, p. 208, s.v. munt(u): ‘An offensive mode of reference to a black person.’
2 Goethe: ‘identifications not by blood but by choice’.
3 Much to my surprise. In line with the general public view of domestic history held in the Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century CE, I took it that the ancestors of the South African Afrikaners, or Boers, parted company with their European brothers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, then in the nineteenth century changed their language into a version of Dutch that is no longer commonly understood in the Netherlands, and finally in the twentieth century commissioned crimes against humanity that for the two reasons mentioned no longer deserve to be associated with the ethnonym Dutch, and that the Dutch of the Netherlands could not be held collectively responsible for. But this was a slightly naïve and anachronistic view. It did not do justice to the factual, and many-sided, linguistic, intellectual, religious, political and demographic continuity between Afrikaners and European Dutch until the middle of the twentieth century – a continuity that was in line with racistist attitudes prevailing in the Netherlands’ Asian and South American colonies right until their end. This embarrassing continuity only came to be denied as far as the past is concerned, and to be
thing’, *is* being the prefix reserved for inanimate objects), and could never become a *motho* (‘person-human’, in the Tswana variant of the -ntu root). Being denied personhood landed me in a depression from which after a few years, thanks to the local treatment that was extended to me, I emerged as a *sangoma*: a local, i.e. African, diviner-spirit, specialist in divination and healing, by public rituals and initiations confirmed in the status of *autochthonous human person*, and moreover, like all traditional religious and therapeutic specialists in Southern Africa, a recognised guardian of the spiritual principles that underlie local society. It is then also that I could realise how much my earlier identity as an investigating, empirical anthropological fieldworker, professionally insisting on the otherness of my African research subjects and on my own strangerhood, constituted an ideology of absolute otherness embarrassingly similar to the restricted concept of *muntu/bantu* in the apartheid sense of African colonial subject. It is this insight that made me leave cultural anthropology behind and instead pursue a form of intercultural philosophy where dialogical intersubjectivity is taking the place of scientific objectivation.

This stance informs the peculiar methodology of the present argument. While I do make use of social science insights into the nature of contemporary Southern African societies (including those based on my own research), I will attempt not to objectify from a scholarly distance; but I will also try to avoid another pitfall: I will not go along with the invitation, extended to the worldwide intellectual community by the Southern African academic codifiers of the concept of *ubuntu*, to treat their intellectual products merely as autonomous philosophical texts, whose contents we may critique academically without going into the specific sociology of knowledge to which these products owe their existence and appeal. Instead, I shall make a personal participant’s contribution to the continuing dialogue on issues of identity, values and conflict. Recognising the utopian and prophetic nature of the concept of *ubuntu* will allow me to see a vast field of positive application for this concept at the centre of the globalised urban societies of Southern Africa today. *Ubuntu* philosophy, I will argue, constitutes not a straight-forward *emic* rendering of a pre-existing African philosophy available since times immemorial in the various languages belonging to the Bantu language family. Instead, *ubuntu* philosophy will be argued to amount to a remote *etic* reconstruction, in an alien globalised format, of a set of implied ideas that do inform aspects of village and kin relations in at least many contexts in contemporary Southern Africa; the historical depth of these ideas is difficult to gauge, and their format differs greatly from the academic codifications of *ubuntu*. After highlighting the anatomy of reconciliation, the role of intellectuals, and the globalisation of Southern African society, my argument concludes with an examination of the potential dangers of *ubuntu* as mystifying real conflict, perpetuating resentment (as in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission), and obscuring the excessive pursuit of individual gain. Finally, the potential released by *ubuntu* will be brought to bear, self-reflexively, on this argument itself, in a bid to
overcome what otherwise might appear to be merely a stalemate between South and North intellectual production.

14.2. Ramose on ubuntu and globalisation
The book *African philosophy through ubuntu* which my friend and former colleague Mogobe Ramose published in Zimbabwe in 1999, is in several respects a remarkable and refreshing contribution to African philosophy. Its background is not (as in most other African philosophy) the societies of West or East Africa but those of Southern Africa; current philosophical work from Africa, Belgium and the Netherlands features among the book’s references while the French influence, so extensive in much of African philosophy, is limited in this case; and the author’s specialisation in the field of the philosophy of international relations (instead of metaphysics, classics, or African Studies) is reflected in the book’s emphases. Its final chapter deals with globalisation and *ubuntu*, and here the argument may be summarised as follows. The globalisation process, in which the modern world is increasingly drawn, amounts to the ascendance of a market-orientated economic logic of maximisation, in which the value, dignity, personal safety, even survival of the human person no longer constitute central concerns. This process is reinforced by the North Atlantic region’s drive for political and cultural hegemony. African societies have suffered greatly in the process, but their lasting value orientation in terms of *ubuntu* holds up an alternative in the sense that it advocates a renewed concern for the human person. This alternative, Ramose argues, is already available, and is constantly applied, in the peripheral contexts of villages and kin groups in Southern Africa today, but it is also capable of inspiring the wider world, where it may give a new and profound meaning to the global debate on human rights.

Because I am a declared and recognised Afrocentrist, such a line of argument should be music to my ears. The argument is in line with the recent exhortations toward an African renaissance. The general attitude implied in this position may be summed up as follows:

‘Africa, which the force of North Atlantic hegemony has for centuries relegated to the periphery of global social, economic, and cultural life, proudly and defiantly declares that it possesses the spiritual resources needed to solve its own problems even though the latter were caused by outside influences – and recommends the same spiritual resources as remedy for the ills of the wider world beyond Africa’.

*Ubuntu* as a form of African philosophy thus blends in with other potential, imagined or real gifts of Africa to the wider world: African music and dance, orality

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1 Ramose 1999.
3 Cf. Mbeki 1999; Mr Mbeki here allowed himself to be inspired by Afrocentrist ideas first formulated by Diop in one of the earliest of his published articles: Diop 1948, 1996.
4 This again is not a quotation but my own vicarious attempt at making the implied argument explicit.
and orature, kingship, healing rituals in which trance and divination play major roles, a specific appreciation of time, being and personhood – all of them cultural achievements from which especially the North Atlantic region could learn a lot and (to judge by the latter’s dominant forms of popular music and dance throughout the twentieth century) is increasingly prepared to learn, in a bid to compensate such spiritual and corporeal limitations and frustrations as may be suspected to hide beneath the North Atlantic region’s economic, technological, political and military complacency.

14.3. Recognising the utopian and prophetic nature of ideology: The dilemmas of deconstruction

We should appreciate such a line of argument as utopian and prophetic.

The word ‘utopian’ comes from the Ancient Greek ou-, ‘no-’, and topos, ‘place’; it designates the act of evoking an ideal society which is – as yet – nowhere to be found except in the philosopher’s blueprint. The production of utopias constitutes a most respectable philosophical tradition: starting with Plato (whose work described utopias in Timaeus and Republic without using the technical term; and whose treatment of Egypt1 is often utopian); then Plutarch (whose idealised description of Sparta is decidedly utopian); then via Thomas More’s Utopia, and via Swift’s and Montesquieu’s caricatural utopias of the early Enlightenment which were only thinly disguised descriptions of their own times and age, to Engels, Mannheim, Bloch, Buber, Dahrendorf – after which the concept ended up as a cornerstone of intercultural philosophy in the work of Mall.2

Less of a recognised philosophical concept is the term ‘prophetic’, associated as this term is with philosophy’s pious twin-sister theology, with the epistemological pitfall of foreknowledge, and with the mystical distancing from rationality.3 By its Ancient Greek etymology, prophetism consists in ‘[officially] speaking on behalf of’. It embodies the herald’s role to which, throughout the Ancient World, special sacredness and sanctuary attached.4 It is the very act of such representation and mediation that is almost universally recognised as sacred, even regardless of the divine, royal or hieratic nature of the party on whose behalf it is spoken. Intercultural philosophers and ethnographers should pay the greatest attention to this cultural formatting of what is, after all, their own role. Intercultural philosophy and ethno-

1 Froidefond 1971.
3 Prophetism scarcely enters into philosophical discourse. In epistemology it may be occasionally – e.g. in mediaeval Jewish philosophy (cf. Rudavsky 2000: 101) – invoked as a boundary condition for the knowledge and agency attributed to a supreme being. However, cf. Derrida 1996, which does stress messianic and prophetic traits.
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graphy are, at best, prophetic commitments. I therefore use ‘prophetic’ here not in the sense of speaking in the name of God, but as addressing the ills, contradictions and aporias of one’s time and age: conditions which one shares with many other members of one’s society, which one therefore has felt and grappled with in one’s personal life, and which, once articulated in more general terms on that personal basis, are recognised by one’s fellow-humans as illuminating, encouraging and empowering.1 It is this ‘prophetic’ methodology that largely informs the present argument; the other methodological theme is my conviction that it is pointless to study the contents of a philosophy (such as ubuntu) in isolation — in vitro — without constant reference to the particular sociology of knowledge by which it came into being and by which it is perpetuated.

Serious problems await the intellectual if she or he fails to perceive utopian and prophetic statements as such, and instead proceeds to an empirical critique as if such statements are meant not primarily to muse and to exhort, but to give a factual description. Let me be allowed a personal example once more:

As beginning lecturers in sociology at the University of Zambia, in the early 1970s, my colleague Margareth Hall and I were invited by that institution’s department of extra-mural studies to tour the capitals of outlying provinces in order to lecture there on State President Kaunda’s contributions to political philosophy and ideology, ‘Zambian humanism’2 – which had become the official philosophy of the country’s ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). Inexperienced, and still without any real-life understanding of African political and social realities, we fell into the trap of publicly and lengthily critiquing Zambian humanism for presenting a distorted, nostalgic, one-sidedly positive portrayal of South Central African village life in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The message was jocularly received in Mansa, Luapula Province, where UNIP had nothing to fear and where the two of us constituted a welcome, though juvenile, intellectual divertimento straight from the national capital. However, things were very different in Mongu. This provincial capital had recently been renamed Western Province to stress the central state’s supremacy after that province had for more than half a century entertained semi-independence as the Barotseland Protectorate.3 Elections were.

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1 For such an approach to prophetism, developed in relation to twentieth century prophets (Mupumani, Tomo Nyirenda alias Mwana Lesa, Alice Lenshina) proclaiming radical transformations of historic African religion in Zambia, cf. my Religious Change in Zambia (van Binsbergen 1981a). The underlying philosophical theory would be Marxist, as throughout that book; also cf. Torrance 1995. In recent philosophy, similar ideas were taken up by Foucault’s archaeological method, which seeks to identify, as part of a philosophically underpinned history of ideas not without Marxist inspiration, the internal relations between discursive elements in a particular historical period without recourse to actors’ explicit intentions and representations (Foucault 1963, 1969). Ironically, Foucault’s later, Nietzsche-inspired, ‘genealogical’ attempt to accommodate change in this perspective, made him stress contingency at the expense of the (Marxist- and structuralist-inspired) structural, systematic and hence repetitive correspondences between society and person on which my view of prophethood depends. Part of the irony is that here he shows himself a diehard historian, member of a discipline that has always defended, as its hallmark, as ‘properly historical’, an emphasis on contingency in the face of historicising social scientists like myself who look for pattern and systematic explanation; but equally ironic is that even such a sense of the historical discipline’s esprit de corps has not prevented Foucault from being a great and innovative mind but a poor historian, especially in his pre-genealogical period. Also cf. chs. 1 and 2 of my Religious change, for a further elaboration (without reference to Foucault) in the context of spirit possession and mediumship, and on the possibility of a sociological theory of religious change.


3 Caplan 1970.
approaching. Mongu was a stronghold for the opposition, and our visit coincided with a vote-rallying visit of UNIP leader Fines Bulawayo. In a formidable public speech the latter contested our right, as recently arrived expatriates straight from our European universities, to meddle in local political thought. For weeks we were kept in suspense, fearing to be declared prohibited immigrants, when finally a personal, remarkably appreciative letter from Mr Kaunda himself saved the situation.

Reflection on this Zambian case may help to bring out the dilemmas that attend, thirty years later, the concept of ubuntu.

Viewed as a moral and political exhortation and an expression of hope for a better future, ubuntu (just like Zambian humanism) creates a moral community, admission to which is not necessarily limited by biological ancestry, nationality, or actual place of residence. To participate in this moral community, therefore, is not a matter of birthright in the narrower, parochial sense. If birthright comes in at all, it is the birthright of any member of the human species to express concern vis-à-vis the conditions under which her or his fellow humans must live, and to act on that basis. Incidentally, the inclusive principle identified is part of the Southern African normative system at the village level, where for instance every adult has the obligation, but also the right, to guard over the interests of all children, regardless of the specific genealogical ties between adult and child. The moral community consists of people sharing a concern for the present and future of a particular local or regional society, seeking to add to the latter’s resources, redressing its ills, and searching its conceptual and spiritual repertoire for inspiration, blueprints, models, encouragement in the process. In South Africa this is the programme of the African renaissance. Afrocentricity creates another such moral community, focusing not on a particular locality or region, but on the African continent as a whole. The people thus implicated may be expected to identify with each other and to be solidary in the pursuit of their concern. Whoever sets out to deconstruct and even debunk the available conceptual and spiritual repertoire publicly, dissociates from this moral community, rents its fabric, and jeopardises its project. From this perspective, Mr Bulawayo, in the above example, was certainly right; and we can understand how Mr Kaunda was able to save the situation by explicitly (re-)admitting, by his charismatic personal intervention, two young Europeans into this moral community.

Leaving the moral and politically mobilising aspect aside, and speaking on a more detached and abstract plane of analysis, we could say that whoever attempts such deconstruction of ideology is guilty of overlooking the distinction between locutionary (≈ factual), illocutionary (≈ putative) and perlocutionary (≈ persuasive) speech acts – a distinction that ever since Austin has proved so fertile. It is easy to see that Zambian humanism and ubuntu are not, in the first place, factual descriptions. They primarily express the speaker’s dreams about norms and practices that allegedly once prevailed in what are now to be considered peripheral places.

1 For references concerning this intellectual movement, see Postscript to chapter 4, and the main text of chapter 15.

2 Austin 1962. For an up-to-date review of this perspective, cf. Avramides 1999, and references cited there.
(notably, within the intimacy of allegedly closely knit villages, urban wards, and kin groups), while the speaker herself or himself is situated at or near the national or global centre. Such dreams about the past and the periphery are articulated, not because the speaker proposes to retire there personally or wishes to exhort other people to take up effective residence there, but because of their inspiring modelling power with regard to central national and even global issues – in other words, because of the alleged persuasive/perlocutionary nature of these dreams1 outside the peripheral domain in which they are claimed to originate and to which they refer back.

If, thirty years later, I have much less difficulty in identifying, in my capacity as a social actor in a concrete Southern African setting, with Zambian humanism, and with ubuntu, it is because I have enjoyed, for these many years, the (part-time) membership of the kind of local communities by distant reference to which these two ideologies have been constructed in the first place. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s I have learned Zambian humanism and ubuntu, not so much as a value system spelled out explicitly (although there was that element, too: during court sessions, weddings, initiation rites, funerals), but especially more implicitly: as a diffuse value orientation informing the lives of others more local than I was then myself. I shared their lives as, alternately, they now applied and affirmed, now transgressed and rejected, these values, within the dynamics of conflicting pressures brought about by personal aspirations; by the sociability expected in a village and kin context; by the multiplicity and mutual incompatibility of their various roles and social ties; and by urban and modern goals, incentives and boundary conditions. It was in terms of this very value orientation that I was allowed to share their lives, and despite frequent transgressions both on my part and their own, this admission to their communities has been one of the greatest sources of pride and joy in my life. It is an honour from which I do not wish to dissociate myself permanently by an act of conceptual deconstruction – even though this refusal greatly complicates my life as both an analyst and a participant, as this book (especially Part III) brings out in detail. This

1 Peter Crossman, in a personal comment, wondered whether such concepts as Austin derived from ordinary English-language use, reflecting the very specific syntactics of expressing modality in that language, could appropriately be applied to languages outside the Indo-European language family, like those of the Bantu language sub-family (a major subset of the Niger-Congo language family), whose syntax is very different. The question implies a specific application of the Whorf–Sapir thesis, according to which it is primarily language that structures our image of reality. In general, the difference between Indo-European and other languages would appear to be relative, not absolute. The recently emerged field of Nostratic studies explores a level of language classification (the macrofamily) subsuming Indo-European with many other languages whose combined areas stretch from Dakar and the North Cape, to the Bering Street, Alaska and Greenland, encompassing most of the Old World and part of the New World (cf. Dolgopol'sky 1998; Bombard & Kerns 1994). In addition to language, but supported by extensive language continuity (of the Dene-Sino-Caucasian macrofamily, rather than the Nostratic one; cf. Shevoroshkin 1991; van Binsbergen, forthcoming (e)), there is the evidence of a widespread Upper Palaeolithic cultural substrate, which even if by now fragmented and subjected to much localising transformation continues to inform part of the cosmology, conceptions of the body, health, healing, power, animal symbolism etc. over much of the Old World. So intuitively, I would strongly disagree with Crossman’s point. However, in this specific case the problem does not really arise, since Zambian humanism and academic ubuntu philosophy are originally expressed in the English language.
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stance has brought me to embrace the status of diviner-priest and to identify with and to represent vocally Afrocentricity.

14.4. The value orientation of the village and the kin group is not standard in Southern Africa today

The value orientation of the village and the kin group, as sketched above, is not within easy reach of the globalised, urban population that has become standard in Southern Africa. Outside contemporary village contexts, it is only selectively and superficially communicated to the Southern African population at large. Much as I endorse Ramose’s point that Southern Africa has something of great value to offer to the globalised world, we differ with regard to the role we assign to globalisation in this connection. For Ramose, globalisation is an outside phenomenon to be countered by ubuntu; I, on the contrary, argue that both contemporary Southern Africa, and ubuntu itself, are among the products of globalisation, and can only be understood as such products.

In the final analysis our two positions will turn out to be much more compatible than this juxtapositioning suggests. We simply attach different meanings to ubuntu. Playing down the well-established hermeneutical insight that all representation is distortion, Ramose sees in ubuntu the value orientation of pre-colonial Southern African villages, which in his opinion is faithfully rendered in the contemporary academic statements of ubuntu philosophy. For Ramose, globalisation, while a worldwide process, in Southern Africa specifically stands for the European, Northern conquest, which has resulted in the large-scale destruction of ubuntu-based communities. From this perspective, a revival of ubuntu counters the course of Southern African history and is a remedy to the trauma caused by colonisation and by the imposition of capitalist relations of production. I, on the other hand, see ubuntu in the first place as a contemporary academic construct, called forth by the same forces of oppression, economic exploitation, and cultural alienation that have shaped Southern African society over the past two centuries. With Ramose I subsume these forces under the term of globalisation. However, on the basis of an extensive discussion of format, I deny the identity between the academic evocation in the form of ubuntu philosophy and the actual value orientation informing pre-colonial Southern African villages. Therefore, although ubuntu philosophy may be able to curb some (certainly not all) of the contemporary traumatic effects of globalisation/conquest, it is a new thing in a globalised format, not a perennial village thing in an authentic format.

Let me elaborate. In South Africa today (and by extension throughout Southern Africa) the established, socially approved and public norm, especially in urban areas, revolves around the emphatic consumption of globally circulating manufactured products; formal education; world religions; formal organisations that structure the state, industry, schools and churches, and civic self-organisation; and notions of authority, causality and truth patterned by constitutional democracy, the Enlighten-
The first lay strategy, adequately recorded in the extensive descriptive literature, is that of joining any of the many thousands of Christian churches that have abounded in Southern Africa since the nineteenth century. Here an essentially imported symbolic idiom, often implicitly blended with local historic elements, creates ‘a place to feel at home’ – a sense of identity and agency largely dependent on the forces of globalisation, yet often capable of restoring dignity.

In such a situation, religious and therapeutic leaders have a number of options open to them: from traditionalist defiance, via a combination of the old and the new,1 to an emphatic rejection of local historic cultural forms (as among African Independent church leaders – who often however smuggle into their Christian practice historic local elements in disguise). To ordinary people without any religious or therapeutic specialism, the strong pressure of globalisation in the public culture leaves open mainly three strategies to adopt vis-à-vis local historic cultural and religious forms.

The second lay strategy, blatantly obvious yet relatively little reflected in the available social-science literature, is to become a ‘nominally-local non-initiate’. Today the majority of inhabitants of Southern Africa, and especially of the Republic of South Africa, have been so effectively exposed to globally circulating cultural, productive, reproductive and consumptive models, underpinned by equally global technologies of information and communication (including the printed press, radio, television, the Internet, and globally circulating styles of dress, self-definition, recreation and work), that they are no longer in any direct contact with, have no longer any real competence with regard to, the values, beliefs and images of Southern African village societies. If these non-initiates would wish to tap these resources (and their most likely reason for occasionally doing so would be a profound existential crisis calling for traditional therapy), they have to learn the values, beliefs and images of the village more or less from scratch, as if they were cultural strangers. It is for this reason that the practice of the traditional healer in Southern Africa today in large part involves re-education and re-conversion of modernised clients: from nominal locals (who are effectively non-believers in historic African religion) to local initiates who are at least competent at the lay level and who can thus begin to play the role of therapeutic and ritual clients of these

1 As the case I described for the urban sangomas: representing a traditionalising ritual idiom in an urban context which not only is thoroughly globalised and commodified, but whose modern and globalised features also penetrate the very texture of the sangomas’ everyday life and ritual practice; cf. van Binsbergen 1999c.
ritual specialists. For the same reason the images of traditional life circulating in urban Southern Africa are superficial and stereotyped at best, and often substantially beyond the truth.

The third strategy, frequently pursued by moderately globalised persons in Southern Africa today yet only sporadically recorded in the social-science literature, is to submit publicly to the pressures of displaying a globalised modern culture, while in the more hidden niches of life, village forms are allowed to play some part, as long as this part is publicly hidden and dissimulated by the person in question.

Thus one can easily be a smartly dressed office clerk pursuing a modern career during the daytime on weekdays, a patron of fashionable cocktail bars after work, and a prominent Christian church elder on most Sundays, spending the rest of the weekend on the construction of a modern house along municipal regulations at some site-and-service residential scheme, while on certain nights in the wee hours one frequents shebeens where alcohol consumption and casual sex are combined with the chanting of ancient songs featuring clans and totems and jokingly challenging those present from other clans – only to return to the village (at a distance of up to a few hundred kilometres) once a month in order to engage there in ritual obligations imposed by the ancestral and High God cults. The latter activities would be kept completely invisible at the urban scene: one will deny – except before people hailing from the same village – all knowledge of and allegiance to them once back in town. In other words, village cultural and religious forms go into hiding under this strategy – they exist only underground and cannot be publicly articulated within the globalised urban space, given the fact that public culture is largely under the spell of Northern conquest and of the subsequent denial of local historic identity under South African apartheid and Zimbabwean colonialism.1

Incidentally, this third strategy, if pursued by intellectuals, is the main source of first-hand knowledge of village conditions as a basis for theorising on ubuntu.

Under the circumstances produced by these three strategies combined, the majority of the population of Southern Africa today cannot be properly said to know and to live ubuntu by virtue of any continuity with village life. They have to be educated to pursue (under the name of ubuntu) a global and urban reformulation of village values. And they learn this on the authority, not of traditional diviner-priests to whom one cannot appeal in the globalised space without great personal embarrassment, but of recognised opinion leaders of the globalised centre: politicians, university intellectuals. And the latter can only reach the globalised urban population if – and this is a point we shall have to come back to below – they cast their message in a format that has currency and legitimacy both for themselves and in the globalised space at large. Ubuntu as a model of thought therefore had to take on a globalised format simply in order to be acceptable to the majority of modern Southern Africans.

This brings us to an examination of the format under which the values, beliefs and images informing village and family life are historically produced. But let us first take a closer look at the most obvious context in which the concept of ubuntu is

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1 I have expressed this view of Southern African ‘traditional’ culture as going underground in a number of articles, e.g. van Binsbergen 1993b, 1993a; also chapters 5 and 6 of the present book.
being applied, that of reconciliation at the central, urban sectors of post-apartheid South African.

14.5. The anatomy of reconciliation and the role of intellectuals in Southern Africa today

As a transformative concept in Southern African large-scale societies recently emerged from devastating armed conflict, ubuntu’s general application is in the sphere of reconciliation.

Now, reconciliation is called for whenever two conflicting parties are opposed to one another yet each may be recognised to have substantial reasons to claim that right is on their side; in such a situation (typical of intercultural contexts, when two life-worlds, two universes of meaning, confront each other; but not limited to such intercultural contexts) no appeal to legal rules will offer a way out of the impasse, because it is precisely the subjective perception, on both sides, of what is right which has created the impasse. Reconciliation now creatively invents an argument of a higher order, in the light of which both parties may voluntarily let go of their subjective conviction of being right, persuaded by considerations of a higher value which, on second thoughts (and with a considerable amount of inventive prodding on the part of the conciliator) both parties turn out to share. Reconciliation therefore amounts to the active creative redefinition, by conceptual and emotive sleight-of-hand (in other words, the deliberate bending of reality for the sake of the solution of conflict) of a situation which, without such redefinition, could only remain a stalemate.

This is how conflict settlement seems to work in numerous cases. In African societies, which tend to be incompletely domesticated by formal organisations, including the state, interpersonal and intergroup conflict often dominate the social process. The social fabric is woven not out of the avoidance but out of the settlement of conflict, by elaborate social technologies (including litigation, ritual, reconciliation) which – at least at the small-scale and intermediate levels – are among the most effective in the world.¹

Such a model of reconciliation will go a long way towards the identification, and the solution, of the kind of conceptual, legal, religion and moral stalemates which largely make up the contemporary, globalising, multicultural world. Reconciliation can be produced by sleight-of-hand, by pressing into service a Grand Narrative or Myth, which often has been invented ad hoc and which is ultimately performative and illusive.

If parties in a conflict define themselves by some kind of particularism that ties them to a locality, a form of production, gender, age, ethnicity, collective experience, etc., then an appeal to universal humankind would provide the ultimate high-order argument, not just in the case of ubuntu, but in all human situations. We must realise

¹ Chapter 11.
that in many other contexts, outside Southern Africa, the appeal to humanness or humanity occurs in ways very similar to those proclaimed by *ubuntu*. The very term 'human rights' suggests as much: it defines\(^1\) not primarily – for such would be superfluous – the ontological entities to whom these rights apply (*humans*), but especially the extent of their application: universal, applying to *all* humans.

Where do such effective Grand Narratives come from in the modern world? We owe the term to Lyotard,\(^2\) but it is Foucault\(^3\) who has called our attention to the fact that, at least in the North Atlantic region during modern times, the societal legitimation and micropolitical underpinning which used to be provided by religion, since the Renaissance and certainly since the Enlightenment has increasingly derived from *scientific* knowledge production. First in the North Atlantic region, and subsequently (after the colonial conquest and its post-colonial consolidation under USA hegemony) on a global scale, science has become the main recognised source of truth, morals, rights and justifications. A conciliator seeking to invent a higher-order reason to bring about reconciliation between two parties locked in a stalled argument, could not do better than to appeal to the world of academia, finding there a new argument which the conflictive dialogue between the parties has hitherto overlooked.

The dominance of North Atlantic scholarly, legal and expressive forms, and the commodified formats defined in those contexts (books, articles, Internet documents, videos, movies, CDs, etc.) mean that arguments effectively originating outside the North Atlantic region, from a totally different and historically fairly unrelated context, stand a good chance of gaining greater conviction if paraded in the name of global (but effectively, as far as their most recent history is concerned, North Atlantic) scientific knowledge production. It is the irony of many identity constructions and identity claims outside the North Atlantic region today that in order to succeed, in order to be taken seriously by their actual and potential adherents and by others including national and international governmental bodies, they need to be formulated in the academic and commodified formats stipulated (even imposed) under North Atlantic hegemony.

There is an alternative, however, that has become more and more articulate in the most recent years. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, as a result of a number of factors (the international oil crisis, Khomeyny’s Iranian revolution, the massive intercontinental migration of Muslims to the North Atlantic region, and the demise of international communism), Islam has emerged on a global scale as the main viable alternative, the main challenge, of the North Atlantic claim to cultural, economic, military, technological and spiritual hegemony. The Palestinian conflict, the Gulf War, the attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, the

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1. The literature on human rights is vast: e.g. cf. Renteln 1985; Scholze 1992; Meron 1991; and from a more general philosophical perspective: Monroe 1996.
subsequent Afghanistan and Iraq wars, are among the manifestations of this challenge and counter-challenge. This is the background of the continued rapid expansion of Islam in Africa today—even though Africans have suffered under Muslim and Christian hands alike in previous centuries, today Islam seems to offer them a global alternative to the North.

A familiar technique to sweep under the table the intolerable submission to North Atlantic models which this process entails, consists in playing down the North Atlantic nature of the format, calling it universal or global instead. And it is quite possible that a genuine transformation, a genuine trans-hegemonic redefinition, takes place in the dominant format, once it is successfully appropriated, adapted and improved upon by intellectual and social constructors who are not in or from the North Atlantic region. In chapter 13 I have explored the global, yet North Atlantic, positioning of Information and Communication Technology in the light of its subsequent, fairly successful African appropriation. There I have argued that it is not the denial of:

(a) North Atlantic antecedents
(b) nor of successful African appropriation and enculturation,

but the recognition of the irresolvable polarity, of the tension relationship between (a) and (b), which provides us with a model that helps to understand the cultural and political contradictions of the modern globalised world. Applying the same insight (which I consider fundamental for intercultural philosophy), we could acknowledge the tension between ancestral and global formats and contents in ubuntu, without seeking to resolve that tension by opting for either of these complementary poles and denying authenticity and legitimacy to the other pole. Let us now investigate both poles in their own right.

14.6. The format of values, beliefs and images informing village and family life

For a proper understanding of the nature and the societal locus of the concept of ubuntu in Southern Africa today it is of the greatest importance to appreciate the specific format under which the ideas, beliefs and images informing today’s village communities and family situations present themselves. Both as an anthropologist and as a diviner-priest, I have familiarised myself somewhat with these formats. The village and family world view is presented by the people as time-honoured, ancestral, unchanging. But this may be deceptive in the light of the familiar model of the ‘invention of tradition’. All we know for sure is:

• that these values, beliefs and images are propounded today,

1 Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983.
that (like any world view wherever and whenever) they inform people’s thoughts and behaviour only partially and far from totally, and

that even in the remotest places and most intimate, most strongly signified situations these values, beliefs and images are often confronted with antagonistic pressures deriving from more globalised domains of contemporary Southern Africa.

It is not only the villagers and academic ubuntu philosophers of Southern Africa who may be suspected of inventing tradition. Also as ethnographers and analysts we are often brought to project the world view we encounter during our research back into the past, at least by a few centuries, perhaps the time of the emergence of the Bantu language family, or even further to the invention of agriculture and animal husbandry – the productive basis of the African village. It is especially tempting to see in today’s village life an unaltered continuation of the normative patterns governing nineteenth-century villages as peopled by the direct ancestors of present-day villagers. But we could only be reasonably sure of such continuity on the basis of extensive historical research, which (although frequently conducted and leading to numerous published products, whose enumeration and critique is beyond the present scope) is severely handicapped by the paucity of vernacular nineteenth-century sources and by the fact that the nineteenth century is sinking below the horizon of living memory and reliable oral tradition. What is more, on theoretical, epistemological and comparative grounds we have to suspect that the Southern African village and the social and normative patterns that governed it, instead of constituting a perennial lived reality, have to some extent been a creation of colonial administration, missionary activities, industrial relations based on labour migration, and social anthropological aggregate description. Anyway, even if it ever were a reality, in the course of the twentieth century the Southern African village increasingly became a myth – not only in the hands of anthropologists, administrators, industrialists and missionaries, but also as reappropriated, from such alien sources, into African perceptions and expressions of identity and nostalgia – as happened also to the concepts of tribe, ethnicity and culture.

In other words, we cannot be sure that even at the level of late-twentieth-century villages in Southern Africa, the concept of ubuntu (or Zambian humanism, for that matter) is more than perlocutionary or illocutionary: constituting not so much the enunciation of an actual practice, but at best a local ideology to which appeal is made whenever actual practice is initiated (for example at initiation rites and

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1 Given the great geographical mobility of most African social forms, the location of the nineteenth-century ancestral villages is unlikely to coincide narrowly with the villages, if any, of their descendants in the late twentieth and early 21st centuries.

2 Ranger 1983.

3 Van Binsbergen 1998a, 2001b, the section entitled ‘The virtual village’.

4 Ranger 1982; the present book, chapter 15.
Chapter 14

weddings) or whenever actual practice is argued (in conflict settlement, divination) to stray too far from this ideal. On such occasions, and in line with my general characterisation of reconciliation as presented above, utterances invoking principles of sociability reminiscent of those which Southern African philosophers have summarised under the heading of *ubuntu* are set in a context of elaborate rhetorical arts in which the available cultural material is presented in a strategic, eclectic, and innovative manner. These verbal elements are often so complex, cryptic, multi-layered and internally contradictory,¹ archaic, and multi-referential,² that the socio-ritual events in which they feature produce *implied* meaning (as a vehicle of sociability within the village and the kin group, but also leaving open the possibility of the opposite of sociability) much more than that they articulate *explicit and codifiable* meaning. Traditional religious leaders and therapists (locally called *banganga*, *dingaka*, *basangoma*, etc.), as well as village elders, chiefs and the specialists (both women and men) supervising puberty initiation, are the guardians and articulators of this world view. Their specific ritual, therapeutic, linguistic (cf. proverbs, archaic and honorific expressions, tabooed words), legal and historical knowledge, in the way in which it is socially utilised in its own proper context, is not systematised, not codified. It is oral, vernacular, rambling, situational. It does not exist in the itemised, linearised, generalised, objectified format of discursive academic descriptions whose globally converging format has crystallised out in the course of the last few millennia in a context of literacy, the state, formal organisations, world religions, worldwide trade, universalising science, and other globalising tendencies. The embeddedness of the Southern African local specialist knowledge in the day-to-day physical and social environment of the rural community and its productive and reproductive processes lends to the local expressions of this knowledge a tacit meaningfulness, a powerful self-evidence, which is practically impossible to reproduce or even to obliquely indicate or suggest outside this original setting except perhaps – under a totally different format – by the elaborate technology of the imagination at the disposal of the novelist and the film-maker. I have never witnessed the technical terms *ubuntu* (or local morphological equivalents) or *Zambian humanism* being used as a matter of course, of accepted parlance, in these concrete situations of the village and the family. At best they have been used as in quasi-quotation, introducing into the vernacular world of the village and the family a deliberately stilted (and often somewhat ironical) reference to the

¹ My critique of *ubuntu* amounts to the allegation that academic codifications of local knowledge after a globally circulating format tend to streamline, linearise and rationalise that knowledge almost beyond recognition. The point can be generalised to include the entire industry, so fashionable since the 1980s and so nicely financed by donor organisations and the UNESCO, that concentrates on capturing 'indigenous knowledge systems' and brings the product of such capture into global circulation, allegedly in order to save such knowledge from extinction, but in fact producing the opposite result, notably, its replacement by a hegemonic travesty.

outside world of literacy, politics and ideology. These terms do not belong to the format of expression proper to those situations. The meanings covered by those terms are admittedly at home in the village and the family, but (because of the various perspectives of -ntu as discussed in the opening section of this argument, and because of the complex, largely implicit way of expressing local social models as indicated in the present section) this semantic complex cannot be said to be articulated predominantly, let alone exclusively, by reference to various nominal forms of the root -ntu.

14.7. Ubuntu as a deceptively vernacular term for an etic concept formulated in a globally circulating format

Therefore, to describe the values, beliefs and images in operation at the village and family level as ‘the Southern African indigenous philosophy of ubuntu’ amounts to a rendering (in discursive academic, specifically philosophical, terms which exemplify globally circulating conceptual usage) of ideas that are certainly implied in Southern African village practices and ideas, but that exist there under different, much more diffuse and situationally varying, linguistic formats. Ubuntu, in the sense of the conceptual complex which modern exponents of ubuntu philosophy claim to exist around that term, is at best a transformative rendering in a globally mediated, analytical language, of vernacular practices and concepts which are very far from having a one-to-one linguistic correspondence with the phraseology of ubuntu philosophy.

Half a century ago the social anthropologist and linguist Pike coined the paired concepts of emic and etic to capture a similar distinction. The systematisation of ubuntu as an alleged indigenous philosophy is an etic practice that remotely, analytically and transformingly represents emic, i.e. vernacular practices that take place in peripheral contexts in present-day Southern Africa, and that in meaning, but not in strict format, may more or less correspond with the explicit, rational, discursive statements as published.

The self-proclaimed experts on ubuntu form a globally-informed, Southern African intellectual elite who, remote in place and social practice from the emic expressions at the village level which they seek to capture, have officially coined the concept of ubuntu as a cornerstone Southern African self-reflexive ethnography.

While the format in which the philosophy of ubuntu is cast in contemporary treatises is that of the Western tradition of discursive philosophical argument, these intellectual productions have a more specific ancestry in the spate of writings which, under the general heading of ‘African philosophy’, have been published by African intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century CE.

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1 Pike 1954; cf. Headland et al. 1990, with an interesting short contribution by one of today’s most prominent philosophers: Quine 1990a. Also cf. the extensive discussion of this pair of concepts in chapter 15 of the present book.
Valentin Mudimbe, a famous analyst and critic of African philosophy as a form of intellectual production, has characterised a major division of such writings (those produced by Roman Catholic or post-Catholic intellectuals with a seminary education) as ‘the liberation of difference’ – of the difference that speaking in an African voice does make – in the context of the White-dominated emergent intellectual climate of colonial and early post-colonial Africa, under strong North Atlantic cultural and political hegemony.1 In order to pinpoint the peculiar handling of historic African cultural and religious material in the context of the intellectual genre of ‘African philosophy’, Mudimbe coined the term *retrodiction* (‘speaking backwards’): African clerical intellectuals like Kagame and Mveng are said to have engaged in retrodiction when they reconstructed and vicariously represented a pre-colonial, pre-Christian African village-based life-world, in which they themselves no longer lived or believed, and which yet was dear to them as a source of inspiration and pride – as an identity recaptured in the face of the North Atlantic rejection of Black people and their powers of thought and agency. In these, in majority francophone, attempts to reconstruct, re-appropriate, and assert a philosophical perspective that is Western in format yet is proclaimed to be pre-colonial African in content, historic2 African thought is depicted as revolving on a human-centred ontology, which African authors and sympathetic European observers3 already half a century ago habitually cast in terms of the same Bantu-language root *-ntu* that was later to emerge as the cornerstone of *ubuntu* philosophy.

In Southern Africa the liberation of Black difference through philosophical (as distinct from literary and artistic) production has lagged behind that in West and East Africa. The adoption of the globally circulating genre of African philosophy by Southern African intellectuals was retarded by the language barrier between English/Afrikaans, on the one hand, and French, on the other; by the relatively late rise to popularity of African philosophy among anglophone intellectuals in the North Atlantic region (including African intellectuals working or studying there); and by the general intellectual isolation in which South Africa was shrouded as a result of the international boycott to which the apartheid state was subjected in the 1970s and especially 1980s.4

*Ubuntu* is a tool for transformation in a context of globalisation. As an *etic* rendering in a globally mediated format, it has emerged, and takes its form and contents, in the realities of post-apartheid South Africa today. The concept of humanity is by definition extremely wide, with many different applications in many

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1 Mudimbe 1997; cf. van Binsbergen 2001a.
2 I use this word as an alternative to the worn-out term ‘traditional’ (which yet occasionally filters into my prose), and more or less as a synonym of ‘pre-colonial’, ‘autochthonous’, ‘pre-globalisation’, ‘pre-world-religion’. What is not meant by ‘historic’ here is: ‘the emic representation of local history’.
4 Needless to add that this international boycott was otherwise highly beneficial in the sense of conducive to the end of minority rule.
different specific contexts. Of these, the current use of the concept of *ubuntu* in South African political and management discourse is likely to be restricted to a few eminently ‘usable’ varieties – usable, not because they betray or deny the past, but because they help to negotiate the future despite the divisiveness of the past and the present. Therefore, looking for the ‘true’ pre-colonial or nineteenth-century meaning of *ubuntu* through etymological, ethnographic and historical procedures would be based on a misunderstanding of what *ubuntu* is, and is meant for. Nonetheless, like most ideologies, *ubuntu* is legitimated by the claim (which in principle amounts to a locutionary statement, open to empirical substantiation or falsification) that this concept sums up the ancestral value orientation of the majority of the Southern African globalised urban population today.

In the works of Southern African writers on *ubuntu*, that concept is presented as a major philosophical achievement, as one of Africa’s great intellectual and moral contributions to humankind as a whole. Here we should distinguish between two points of view:

(a) the systematic, expert, and loving reconstruction of African systems of thought, and

(b) the view of culture as integrated and unified, as if organised around one alleged key concept artificially raised to star status – in this case the concept of *ubuntu*.

As a long-standing intellectual endeavour of the greatest value, the pursuit of (a) has been, and will continue to be, one of the important tasks of cultural anthropology, African philosophy and intercultural philosophy. This pursuit depends, for its epistemological acceptability, on explicit, collectively underpinned scholarly procedures whose specific nature is critically defined by the disciplinary community of Africanist researchers, in Africa and elsewhere, in continuous debate. In this process the contribution on the part of African researchers and non-academic sages is increasingly substantial, and more and more taken into account. The present argument is a contribution to that endeavour. The current *ubuntu* industry, however, has largely resorted to (b): distantly, and without recourse to explicit and systematic methodological and empirical procedures, but instead driven by academic philosophers’ and management consultants’ intuitive linguistic analyses and childhood reminiscences. If *ubuntu* is to be Africa’s great gift to the global world of thought, it is primarily not the African villagers’ gift, but that of the academic and managerial codifiers who allowed themselves to be distantly and selectively inspired by village life: ignoring the ubiquitous conflicts and contradictions, the oppressive immanence of the world view, the witchcraft beliefs and accusations, the constant

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1 For a critique of this notion, cf. chapter 15, and references cited there.

2 On the role which some African philosophers attribute to the sage (as distinct from the religious and therapeutic specialist) in African philosophy, cf. Odera Oruka 1990b; for a critical note, cf. chapter 15.
oscillation between trust and distrust, and merely appropriating and representing the bright side.

14.8. Why *ubuntu* can yet be expected to make a difference

Having said this, the major questions remains: *Can ubuntu philosophy be expected to bring the positive change advocated in its name? And how would we substantiate our answer to this question?*

Statements of *ubuntu* philosophy suggest that, now the mists of North Atlantic hegemonic subjugation and the ensuing self-censorship have been lifted from the minds of African thinkers, the true African thought can come out in an unadulterated form which, since the urban, modern consumers of such a restated philosophy can largely identify as Africans, will inspire their actions in majority-rule South Africa and Zimbabwe for the better. We have to take considerable distance from this suggestion, without totally dismissing it.

The production of *ubuntu* philosophy is better described in the following terms:

A regional intellectual elite, largely or totally weaned away from the village and kin contexts to which *ubuntu* philosophy explicitly refers, employs a globally circulating and, in origin, primarily North Atlantic format of intellectual production in order to articulate, from a considerable distance, African contents reconstructed by linguistic, ethno-graphic and other means that are largely unsystematic and intuitive.

‘Liberation of Black difference’ as an expression is not far from the creation of a moral community of people concerned about the present and future of Southern Africa, which in the opening paragraphs of this argument I identified as the obvious goal of the *ubuntu* philosophy. Since most of the forces that have shaped the societies of contemporary Southern Africa can be subsumed under the heading of globalisation, it stands to reason that an intellectual product meant to overcome the negative effects of these forces has to be global in format, even though its contents is largely inspired by the local intimacy of village and kin group. If, in concrete situations of social transformation and conflict, the appeal to *ubuntu* is going to make a positive difference, the global format lends recognition and respectability in ways which the original, implicit normative orientation of contemporary Southern African village and kin situation could never claim in an urban, globalised context. In this respect, the intellectual exponents of *ubuntu* may be said to have created a potentially powerful tool. Since the tool is to be used exhortatively in Southern African situations that are largely globalised, it does not really matter whether the ethnographic and linguistic underpinnings of *ubuntu* philosophy are empirically and epistemologically impeccable in the way they should be if *ubuntu* philosophy were primarily locutionary (an *etic* restatement of *emic* concepts of agency), instead of an exhortative instrument at the service of modern urban society at large. Being prophetic, *ubuntu* philosophy seeks to address fundamental ills in the make-up of urban, globalised Southern Africa: the social life-world of its academic authors. Being utopian, the images of concrete social life featuring in statements of *ubuntu* do not have to correspond to any lived reality anywhere – they are allowed to refer to
‘No-Place’, and to merely depict, through social imagery, desired changes to be brought about by an application of the precepts contained in ubuntu.

How then could ubuntu, conjuring up images of a viable and intact village society, be expected to make a difference in the utterly globalised context of urban Southern Africa and its conflict-ridden social, industrial, ethnic and political scene? Would not the rural reference, because of its obvious irrelevance in the urban globalised context, annul any advantages that may be derived from the globalised format of ubuntu philosophy?

I can see at least three reasons to expect considerable success for ubuntu.

One reason I take from the analogy with the initiation rites of girls in contemporary urban Zambia, a social context that (despite its poverty and defective infrastructure) is in many respects comparable to, and continuous with, South Africa and Zimbabwe. These initiation rites are cast in a time-honoured rural idiom revolving on female identity, as underpinned by a detailed knowledge and appreciation of the female body, and a celebration and sacralisation of productive and reproductive capacities, often in forms and with emphasis way out of line with current urban life. One would have expected such rites to decline and disappear, but, on the contrary, they are becoming more and more popular, especially among the middle classes: the construction of female identity with powerful, extremely ancient (probably Late Palaeolithic) symbols is apparently of lasting, major concern even, or especially, in the face of globalisation. Ubuntu could serve an analogous purpose.

In the second place, the symbolic technologies offered by local village-based symbols, concepts and practices, be they girls’ initiation rites, ubuntu, or otherwise, constitute a form of symbolic empowerment for the very people who (in Zambia in the late 1950s, in Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s) fought to attain majority rule and cast off the yoke of North Atlantic cultural and symbolic, as well as political, military and economic, dominance. Ubuntu offers the appearance of an ancestral model to them that is credible and with which they can identify, regardless of whether these globalised urban people still observe ancestral codes of conduct (of course in most respects they do not), regardless of whether the ancestral codes are rendered correctly (often they are not).

In the third place, ubuntu is especially appealed to when it comes to the settlement of seemingly unsolvable conflicts and insurmountable contradictions – such as massively dominate life in Southern Africa today. Against the background of the anatomy of reconciliation discussed above, ubuntu, when appealed to in the modern management of urban and national conflicts, can be effective. But not because it summarises the internalised cultural orientations of the Africans involved in such conflict – very far from it, for these Africans are largely globalised in their world view and practices, and are no more governed by village rules and allegiances than people in similar urban and national arenas in other continents. Despite having rural and small-scale face-to-face relationships as its referent, ubuntu can be

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1 Rasing 1995, 2001; and chapter 3 of the present book.
effective; in the first place, because it is appreciated as an African thing, but, in the second place, and especially because, despite its globally-derived format, it introduces non-global, particularistic and intimate elements into the very heart of Southern African globalisation. *Ubuntu* can work precisely because it is novel, out of place there where it is most appealed to by modern South African industrial managers, politicians and academics. In the best tradition of reconciliation as innovative sleight of hand (see chapter 11), it allows the conflict regulator to introduce an unexpected perspective to which (for historical, identity and strategic reasons) few parties could afford to say ‘no’.

14.9. Limitations and dangers of *ubuntu*

*Ubuntu* then appears as a lubricant of social relations at the globalised urban centre of contemporary Southern African society, as a *deus ex machina* offering a way out where little else can. If it helps to overcome otherwise insurmountable contradictions, it produces sociability and alleviates tension. It may do so in situations where avoiding or overcoming the manifestation of open conflict is to the benefit of all parties involved.

When in contemporary South African situations of transition an appeal is made to *ubuntu*, this means in the first place an invocation of the fellow-humanity of all involved in the concrete situation at hand. It is a way of saying:

> Admittedly, we have so many things that divide us, in terms of age, gender, class, wealth, somatic appearance, cultural style, language, ethnicity, political allegiance; all these identities refer to past experiences which may have been very different and in the course of which the various sets of human beings which make up the present concrete situation may have found themselves in opposite but complementary positions of exploitation, suffering, violence, denial, wrong-doing. It is no use denying these differences and the historical experiences that are tied to them; it is in fact impossible to deny them. Yet, by stressing our common, shared humanity we hope to define a common ground which may help us to find a way out of the impasse which our historical difference have ended us up in.¹

So far so good. But we hit here on a theoretical danger of *ubuntu*. Use of this term tempts us to deny all other possibilities of identification between Southern African actors (i.e., fellow citizens of the same state, fellow inhabitants of the same local space) except at the most abstract, most comprehensive level of humankind as a whole: as fellow human beings. It is as if in a gathering of humans one appeals to the fundamental unity of all vertebrates, or of all animate beings, instead of resorting to the lower, relatively local, and obviously more effectively binding, category of humans; or as if one addresses the members of one’s family appealing to their shared identity, not as family members, but as fellow-nationals, co-religionists, fellow Africans, or any other category far wider than the comfortably narrow scope of the family. It is, in short, the perplexing and demobilising choice of the wrong level of aggregation. An appeal to *ubuntu* implies that the speaker can see no other grounds

¹ This again is not a quotation but my own vicarious attempt at making the implied argument explicit.
for identification between the locals involved in a given Southern African situation, than their belonging to humankind at large (including the inhabitants of Patagonia, the Ancient Mesopotamians, probably even the Neanderthals), thus implicitly taking for real and insurmountable the divisions of class, somatic appearance, ethnicity, language, gender, religious denomination and political affiliation that – once grotesquely emphasised under the apartheid and colonial state – still enter into any concrete social situation in Southern Africa. Appealing, in any Southern African gathering of local citizens, members of the same local community, the same polity, speaking the same linguae franae, having lived through the same traumatic experience of apartheid, enjoying the same benefit of South Africa’s restored esteem and economic hegemony among the nations of Africa and the world – appealing, in such a context, merely to a shared humanity, amounts to denying, in effect, the entire moral, historical, informational and cultural local texture out of which any nation-state consists, even a traumatised and globalised one like South Africa. It is almost as if apartheid has been victorious, after all.

Moreover, I fear that ubuntu would also serve as a lubricant or a pacifier (in the child-care sense) in situations where conflict is real and should not be obscured by smothering it under a blanket of mutually recognised humanity of the parties involved. I shall briefly discuss two such instances: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and continuing class conflict after the attainment of majority rule.

Probably the most widely advertised public application of the concept of ubuntu (although the concept itself remained largely implicit in that context) was that of the TRC, which reviewed the crimes against humanity perpetrated under apartheid, and offered the perpetrators re-acceptance into the new South African society at no greater personal cost than admission of guilt and offering of apologies. Here ubuntu, from a quality that a person could have or have not, obtained a relational dimension: it became something that one could generously extend to those who had themselves shown (by their less than human behaviour towards their fellow humans) to have too little of it. The semantic field of ubuntu came to include ‘the perpetrators’ restored personhood as granted by the very individual they wronged.’ Underlying this is a concept of reconciliation that is profoundly Christian. It can be no accident that no traditional diviner-priests (guardians of the ancestral world view) participated in the TRC context, where they could have articulated historic Southern African viewpoints on evil, sin, i.e. not only the possibility but also the limitations of expiation. In the absence of such experts, the concept of ubuntu was to supply what little traditional guidance was allowed to inform the situation. The Black African population of South Africa, having been immensely wronged by White people with a European background, was in the end not even free to define the terms under which it would be prepared to leave this past behind them, and to include regional historic elements of an African culture of justice and expiation among these terms; no, even the terms of reconciliation had to be set by European and White dominance – even if this dominance had the amicable, integrity-exuding and unmistakably Black face of
Archbishop Tutu. The TRC, and the occasional appeal to ubuntu in that connection, conveyed the suggestion that unconditional forgiveness and cleansing merely on the basis of a verbal admission of guilt is part of the Southern African ancestral cultural heritage, and who has ever heard of an appeal being made against an ancestral cultural heritage? Such an appeal would place one, to repeat my earlier expression, outside the moral community which the TRC proceedings tried to create and reinforce at all costs. But, as we have seen above when discussing ubuntu under its socio-legal aspect, it may be misleading to suggest that a Roman–Catholic/Anglican Christian model of confession and absolution epitomises the ancient Southern African world view as subsumed under the concept of ubuntu. The perpetrators of atrocities under the apartheid state might qualify as sorcerers and might have been treated accordingly. For such treatment a number of precepts are available, ranging from capital punishment to readmission into the folds of humanity, but the latter at far greater personal costs than just a verbal admission of guilt. This is one major example of how under contemporary conditions ubuntu is pressed into service at the centre of national political affairs, in mystifying ways that deny or pervert time-honoured African values, under the pretence of articulating those very values. In years to come South African society may yet have to pay the price for the massive and manipulative repression of resentment and anger caused by the historically questionable use of ubuntu in the context of the TRC.

Something similar can be seen in the handling of ubuntu in the context of continuing and acerbating class conflict in Southern Africa today. The transformation of Zimbabwe after 1980, and that of South Africa after 1990, has involved a massive reshuffle of social, economic and political power. In both countries, the White–Black contradiction that dominated the decades before majority rule, has resulted in the overthrow of White supremacy, but in most other respects the fundamental relations of inequality were not radically confronted: those between town and country, between land-owners and the landless, between middle classes and the urban poor, between men and women, between the educated and the non-educated, and between the middle-aged and the young. Here ubuntu often does serve as a liberating, empowering and identity-building transformative concept in the hands of those who wish to build the country. But it may also be wielded as a mystifying concept in the hands of those who, after the post-apartheid reshuffle, were able personally to cross over to the privileged side of the huge class divide, without being over-sensitive to the wider social costs of their individual economic and status advancement. This process is widely noticeable in South Africa today. It is what people euphemistically call the Africanisation of that country’s economic and public sphere. In such a situation of post-apartheid class formation, Africans with widely different access to power resources increasingly confront each other in conflict over scarce resources within industry, formal organisations, neighbourhood affairs, politics. It there not the danger here of ubuntu being turned into a populistic, mystifying ideology, dissimulating the real class conflict at hand, and persuading the more powerless Blacks involved to yield to the more powerful ones as soon as the
latter wave the flag of *ubuntu*? The newly emerging Black elite seem to be saying to their opponents:

‘How could you, our fellow-Africans, possibly question our decisions? We are merely applying, in yours interest as well as in ours, our most cherished common African ancestral heritage, our *ubuntu*!…’

For a Black South African already dropping out of the process of material self-advancement in the post-apartheid era, calling the bluff of such manipulative usage of *ubuntu* would only be asking for further marginalisation. Thus the concept emphatically meant for the restoration of identity and for re-empowerment, risks being deployed against the very people whose ancestral culture it seeks to celebrate.

With a crime rate that is by far the highest in the world, post-apartheid South Africa needs, in addition to the sociability of *ubuntu*, more factual, locutionary, and urban-based tools of self-redress – including a profound commitment to class analysis and gender analysis; an admittance that certain contradictions are simply too real to smother under expressions of sociability and populism; a positive appreciation of legitimate force, even violence (if truly monopolised by a truly democratic state), in the creation and maintenance of socially essential boundaries – boundaries that protect the values they enclose, instead of excluding a majority of people from partaking of those values; and a sustained reflection on the dangers of repressed anger, resentment and grief.

Without the further elaboration stipulated in the previous paragraph, *ubuntu* runs the risk of sinking back to the semantic field where the kindred words *muntu* and *bantu* (as well as the originally Arabic *kaffir*, ‘infidel’) were situated for many decades in South Africa under apartheid: pejorative expressions for financially robbed, easily exploitable, legally unprotected, socially excluded and mentally broken Black subject-hood.

That *ubuntu* carries, in principle, the potential of referring, not to the liberation of Black African difference but to its subjugation to White class interests, and by extension to elite interests in general, became clear to me when in 1999, as a member of a team which also included Mogobe Ramose, Vernie February and the local Roman Catholic pastor, I took part in interviewing a village elder in a rural district about 60 km north of Pretoria. A straightforward translation of the (Nguni) concept of *ubuntu* was impeded by the fact that the conversation was conducted in the Tswana language (where *ubuntu* translates as *botho*). Expecting to trigger, with our magical concept, a full indigenous philosophical account on local values of humanness, our unmistakable ‘sage’ utterly failed to oblige, and instead treated us to a long and shocking story on the history of his village throughout the twentieth century – a history in which *bantu*-hood (for that is another, obvious meaning of the word *ubuntu*) was clearly conceived, in the apartheid sense, as the experience of suffering at the hands of local White self-styled landowners.

This is a usage of the root -ntu that was explicitly acknowledged in the beginning of this chapter when setting out that root’s semantic field. I suspect that this meaning continues to adhere, marginally and implicitly, even to the most transformative,

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1 As previous note.
liberating usage of *ubuntu* in modern urban Southern Africa, as an ironical reminder that this concept carries, in the best dialectic (Marx) or deconstructive (Derrida) traditions, the seeds of its own opposite or denial. We must not underrate such a concept’s rhetorical and manipulative potential for mystification, counteracting its potential for positive exhortation.

In the light of these moral, humanitarian and political concerns, I may be justified in presenting this critical argument. Probably, for some exponents of *ubuntu* this criticism will expel me, after all, from the moral community for whose creation *ubuntu* philosophy was intended in the first place. Such an expulsion may not quite be in the spirit of the concept of *ubuntu*, but may not be as disastrous as it seems either. Perhaps a moral community constructed, with some explicable success, by *ubuntu*, is not the only moral community that Southern Africa needs in these difficult times. In addition to the entrancing (and often deceptively vulnerable, manipulable and ephemeral) communities created by the articulation of identity, invented tradition, and common humanity (for instance, by an appeal to *ubuntu*), it is no shame to also aspire to membership of the moral community that (in the best radical, Marxist tradition of South African intellectual life) sees the intellectual discharge of solidarity in the explicit, emphatic expression of social contradictions, and not in their dissimulation (as *ubuntu* seeks to do).

14.10. Conclusion: The vindication of *ubuntu* as an escape from violence

However, if I would conclude my argument at this point it would defeat its whole purpose. Certainly, African philosophers theorising about *ubuntu* invite academic criticisms simply by their very choice of adopting an academic, globalised format of expression. I have offered such criticism in good faith. In conclusion, though, it is imperative to make explicit, and to neutralise, a number of fundamental dangers, and, if possible, to nip a number of possible misunderstandings in the bud.

Has the purpose of my argument been to humiliate my African colleagues and friends, an arrogant exercise in *Besserwissen* (‘narrow-minded and fanatical ‘knowing better’”), with me going to lengths to reduce to a specific sociology of globalised knowledge the position of the academic authors of *ubuntu* philosophy, whilst at the same time portraying my own knowledge production as informed by timeless, universal scientifically underpinned truth? If that had been my intention I would commit a great injustice, considering the fact that *ubuntu*, while being an academic philosophy emulating a globalised format, is in the first place born out of pain, exclusion, justified anger, and the struggle to regain dignity and identity in the face of Northern conquest and oppression. When I situated the total transformation of Southern African societies under White domination, the need to produce *ubuntu*, and the production of *ubuntu* itself, in a context of globalisation, this globalisation was clearly not a neutral process (not the myth of universal limitless access propagated by liberal proponents of globalisation) but a form of violence. Surely one
does not help erase the effects of such violence by an argument that boils down to more violence from the North, and leave it at that.

One cannot present elements of an anatomy of reconciliation (as I did above) yet end the argument in a formidable contradiction between Southern theoreticians of ubuntu, on the one hand, and me as a Northern critic, on the other. Therefore, let us go one step further and admit the amazing similarities that exist between these two parties. The reader has been looking in on a frank, dogged, at times heated, conversation between members of the same family, who have grown up without totally casting off the irritations they caused each other when still children, yet know that they are irrevocably inseparable, produced by a shared history. If the format of the ubuntu philosophy (and of all African philosophy, for that matter) is globalised and alien to the village and kinship matters it tries to explicate – so is the format of the present argument, of intercultural philosophy, and of ethnography. The same paradox applies to both sides: that of being, at the same time, inevitably and fundamentally distortive, and yet constituting a serious and valuable interpretation carried by the quest for integrity. If the relationship between the theoreticians of ubuntu, and the peripheral situations they try to represent, are distant, strained, contradictory, vicarious, yet intimate and legitimate – so is the relationship between the present writer and the communities of Southern African communities of which he is a part-time member. If globalisation produced Southern African intellectuals, including the theoreticians of ubuntu, so it produced social anthropologists and caused them to insert themselves into Southern African peripheral communities. If the production of ubuntu philosophy is prophetic and utopian, so – as I admitted explicitly above – is my own stance in this argument. If the theoreticians of ubuntu produce a Grand Narrative, so are other Grand Narratives hovering over my own side of the argument: the idea that scientific ethnography produces valid knowledge, and the idea that one can place oneself outside the course of hegemonic history by identifying closely with the peripheral victims of that history. If the theoreticians of ubuntu readily oscillate between perlocutionary blueprints and locutionary factual description of village and family situations, so do I oscillate between, on the one hand, an hermeneutical reading of my own predicaments as a post-ethnographer, and, on the other (vis-à-vis the ubuntu theoreticians), a critical stance that cannot possibly be hermeneutical but amounts to ideological critique. The precarious nature of the relationship between ubuntu theoreticians and Southern African villages has everything to do with the history of Northern violence and cultural destruction, which has produced globalised African intellectuals, but at the double cost of expelling them from a local home of meaningfulness, and of nearly destroying these homes anyway. For a European professional anthropologist, the step of becoming a Southern African diviner-priest, as well as the step of becoming the adoptive son of King Kahare Kabambi of the Nkoya people (my two main credentials when – however uncertainly and unconvincingly – posing as more or less a local to Southern African affairs), do both manifest the same commitment to countering the course of Southern African history which is also at the root of ubuntu philosophy.
The contradictions underlying my argument on *ubuntu* are reminiscent of the tension between the critique of ideology, on the one hand, and the championing of tradition, on the other, as brought out in the famous debate between Gadamer and Habermas in the 1960s and 1970s. The remarkable point in the case of *ubuntu* is that both sides (the academic *ubuntu* philosophers, and I myself) display these contradictions not only in their interaction with the other side, but also in themselves. For the *ubuntu* philosophers break a lance for tradition, but at the same time engage in the critique of ideology when exposing the ills of globalisation; alternatively, I exercise the critique of ideology when I expose the *ubuntu* philosophers’ appeal to Southern African tradition as nostalgic, distant, and cast in a globalised academic format, but, at the same time, I feel justified in playing the role of mouthpiece of that same tradition when explicitly identifying myself as a *sangoma* – which is not only a traditional role, but whose very task it is to articulate the ancestral tradition, and draw his suffering clients back to it.

The point is not whether my part-time membership of Southern African peripheral communities has created a setting where, through the skilful application of the professional empirical procedures of state-of-the-art ethnography, more valid knowledge is being produced than by the introspection, childhood memories, linguistic reflection and occasional rural visits of the theorists of *ubuntu*. On the contrary, the very idea of such superiority would mean that we are still blind to the power implications of launching, and contesting, *ubuntu*. Claiming an ethnographically underpinned superior insight simply means yet more Northern violence, inviting Southern counter-violence. The point is this: Any social situation in which one truly, existentially takes part, breeds, through the experience of such participation, a subjective reality from which one cannot and will not distance oneself. My ‘insights’ into the peripheral Southern African situations that I have lived intensively and for a long time, are inescapably true to me, not because I applied state-of-the-art ethnographic techniques in those settings and therefore feel justified (although I am not) to lay claim to epistemologically validated truth for my ethnographic pronouncements – no, they are (subjectively) true in the first place because they are me, because I constitute myself as a person on the basis of those experiences, because I am not in the least prepared to suffer the self-destruction that a relative stance vis-à-vis these experiences would entail. Exactly the same mechanism informs the situation of the *ubuntu* theoreticians: their pronouncements on the essential African village before, or outside the reach of, Northern destruction are true, not for procedural epistemological reasons but because such pronouncements sum up their uncompromising personal identity constituted out of the experiences of exclusion, humiliation, anger and contestation.

It is not mutually exclusive, monopolistic claims to truth and sanity (and the attending responses in terms of ideological critique, and psychoanalysis), but

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differences of interests,¹ that divide the participants in this argument’s conversation on *ubuntu*. And these interests are not primarily academic status and honour, nor struggles over the right to officiate on African philosophy, nor struggles over a birthright, but the most essential interest of not being destroyed by the implications of the other’s self-construction.

If I am not mistaken, *ubuntu* contains an effective precept for the management of such a vital interest: the secret of the village headman’s skill who, while lacking all formal sanctions, yet through the imaginative power of reconciliation manages to safeguard the conflicting interests of the members of his little community, without destroying any of them. But those who have lived Southern African village life also know that these subtle and eminently constructive skills often go unappreciated when running counter to the individual village member’s short-term self-interests, and then a rumour of sorcery readily attaches to the incumbent of the headmanship, of all people.

Ultimately, then, this conversation about *ubuntu* revolves on the question of how to avoid or domesticate violence: the violence that is produced by text (the texts of African philosophy, intercultural philosophy, Africanist ethnography); the violence that is produced by representation (by intellectuals, of aspects of human life that are lost to them or that never were theirs in the first place); the violence that is produced by the formal organisation (of academic disciplines, their validity-underpinning epistemological procedures, and the built-in rivalry between their members; of the colonial state; of the capitalist economy); the violence that is produced by globalisation as a vehicle of all the above. Seen in this light, the concept of *ubuntu* is historically determined to constitute a bone of contention, to remind us of past violence and to lead us into new violence, until we realise that, above all, *ubuntu* is the invitation to confront this determination and, together, rise above such violence. Only then can our work, on or about *ubuntu*, benefit the poor and powerless people of Southern Africa, with whom the theoreticians of *ubuntu* clearly identify even more than I do.

¹ Cf. Habermas 1970.